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Do Local Manufacturing Firms Benefit from Transactional Linkages with 
Multinational Enterprises in China? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the linkage effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on firm-level 
productivity in Chinese manufacturing. It is found that FDI generates positive vertical 
linkage effects in Chinese manufacturing at both the national and regional level, and 
limited positive horizontal spillovers at the regional level. While OECD firms gain from 
both vertical and probably horizontal linkages, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwanese firms 
only benefit from backward linkage effects. In the domestic sector in which we are most 
interested, both SOEs and non-SOEs are hurt by competition from foreign firms in the 
same industries. While SOEs gain from vertical linkages with foreign firms, non-SOEs 
are unable to do so. The patterns of productivity spillovers from FDI in Chinese 
manufacturing seem to be determined by one key factor – technological capabilities of 
firms involved. Important data limitations and policy implications of this research are 
discussed.  
 
JEL Codes:  F2, O1, O3. 
Key Words: FDI, Horizontal and vertical linkages, Firm and sector groupings; 
Technological capabilities. 
 3 
  
I. Introduction 
 
Although the important role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in economic development 
in host countries is widely recognized, there have only been a few studies on linkage 
effects of foreign firms. On one hand, Rodríguez-Clare (1996), Markusen and Venables 
(1999) and Lin and Saggi (2005) present their respective theoretical models for the 
relationship between FDI, linkage and economic development. On the other, empirical 
analysis based on large firm-level data sets tends to focus on one dimension of linkage 
effects, i.e. horizontal linkages. To the best of our knowledge, only a few studies 
investigate both horizontal and vertical linkage effects simultaneously, including 
Driffield et al. (2002), Javorcik (2004) and Blalock and Gertler (2007) which offer 
empirical evidence of FDI linkage effects for the UK, Lithuania and Indonesia 
respectively.  
 
While these studies shed some light on the channels through which a local economy may 
benefit from the presence of FDI, there is still “a significant gap between the consensus 
among practitioners and the empirical literature regarding the importance of positive FDI 
externalities” (Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare, 2004). Given that a key factor determining 
the benefits host countries can derive from FDI is the linkages that foreign affiliates 
establish with indigenous firms (UNCTAD, 2001), “certainly more research is needed to 
fully understand the effect of FDI on host countries” (Javorcik, 2004). 
 
This paper aims to add to the analysis of FDI linkage effects in a large emerging 
economy – China. Specifically, it adopts a two-step procedure similar to that employed 
by Javorcik (2004) to examine the extent to which the presence of FDI impacts on firm-
level productivity in Chinese manufacturing. In the first step, total factor productivity 
(TFP) in firms is estimated using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method. Then the linkage 
effects of FDI on TFP are investigated. An application of different measures of foreign 
presence to catch possibly different aspects of the linkage effects at both the national and 
regional levels and on firms of different ownership is a feature of this study. We find 
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positive vertical linkage effects in Chinese manufacturing at the national and regional 
level, and limited positive horizontal spillovers at the regional level. FDI linkage effects 
vary with firms of different ownership and to some extent with different measures of 
foreign presence. While OECD firms gain from both vertical and probably horizontal 
linkages, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwanese firms only benefit from backward linkage 
effects. In the domestic sector in which we are most interested, both state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs are hurt by competition from foreign firms in the same 
industries. While SOEs gain from vertical linkages with foreign firms, non-SOEs are 
unable to do so.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the relevant 
literature and provides our arguments. Section III describes our empirical model, data and 
methodology. Section IV presents estimation results. Finally, section V summarizes the 
main findings and discusses policy implications as well as limitations of the study.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
FDI is a package of capital, technology and managerial skills, and is viewed as an 
important source of both direct capital inputs and indirect knowledge spillovers 
(Balasubramanyam et al. 1996).  As widely accepted, the most important reason why 
many countries are determined to attract FDI is the prospect of acquiring modern 
technology. Broadly interpreted, technology includes product, process, and distribution 
technology, as well as management and marketing skills (Blomström and Kokko, 1998).  
 
It is now widely recognized that the strongest channel for diffusing skills, knowledge and 
technology from foreign affiliates is the linkages they establish with local firms and 
institutions. Such linkages can contribute to the growth of a vibrant domestic sector, the 
bedrock of economic development (UNCTAD, 2001). It is also widely acknowledged 
that the mechanisms of knowledge spillovers via horizontal linkages are different from 
vertical linkages (Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 
2004). 
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II.1 Horizontal Linkages 
 
As defined in UNCTAD (2001), horizontal linkages involve interactions with firms 
engaged in competing activities. In this process, spillovers may take place when local 
firms improve their efficiency by copying technologies of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) either through observation or by hiring workers trained by the MNEs, and when 
local firms are forced to use their resources more efficiently or search for new 
technologies because of severe competition from MNEs. However, these channels may 
rarely work effectively. If local and foreign firms compete in the same industry, then the 
latter have an incentive to prevent technology leakage and spillovers from taking place by 
protecting their intellectual property, trade secrecy, paying higher wages to prevent labor 
turnover, or locating in countries or industries where local firms have limited imitative 
capacities to begin with.  
 
Perez (1997) maintains that the capacity of firms to ‘catch up’ depends on their level of 
competitiveness. The extent to which competing firms can benefit from horizontal 
linkages of FDI also depends on the technology gap between these firms and MNEs: (1) 
if competing firms do not lag too far behind MNEs they can embark on a catch-up 
process and benefit from the presence of FDI; (2) if competing firms are far behind 
MNEs it may be impractical for them to benefit substantially from foreign firms’ 
knowledge and consequently they fall even further behind (Cantwell, 1989, 1995). 
Furthermore, Aitken and Harrison (1999) note “market-stealing effects”, i.e. the entry of 
local-market-oriented foreign firms can draw demand from local firms, causing them to 
cut production. Thus, the productivity of local firms would fall as they are forced back up 
their average cost curves. As a result, net productivity can decline. Thus, productivity 
spillovers can be negative as well as positive. In a recent survey, Görg and Greenaway 
(2004) find only twenty two out of the forty selected studies of horizontal productivity 
spillovers (up to the year of 2002) report unambiguously positive and statistically 
significant externalities. 
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There are several studies on FDI horizontal spillovers in China using firm-level panel 
data, including Hu and Jefferson (2002), Wei and Liu (2006) and Wei et al. (2008). Hu 
and Jefferson (2002) confirm the existence of negative horizontal spillover effects of FDI 
in the electronics industry, but not in the textile industry, while Wei and Liu (2006) and 
Wei et al. (2008) report positive horizontal spillovers of FDI in Chinese manufacturing.  
Wei and Liu (2006) suggest that the spillover effects may depend partially on the way 
foreign presence is measured because each of the indicators identified in the literature 
(equity capital, employment, R&D, exports, sales and output) may capture a different 
aspect of spillover effects. Would the conclusion of little positive horizontal spillovers in 
developing countries be altered if different measures of foreign presence are utilized in 
the linkage effect research? This is one of the questions this research paper attempts to 
answer.  
 
II.2 Vertical Linkages 
 
Vertical linkages include both backward linkages and forward linkages. Backward 
linkages exist when foreign firms acquire goods and services from firms in upstream 
industries. They can contribute to the upgrading of local firms and embed foreign firms 
more firmly in host economies (UNCTAD, 2001). Dunning (1993) shows that FDI may 
affect suppliers not just in terms of the quantities of goods and services that are 
purchased, but also through an impact on the quality of inputs, and the efficiency with 
which those inputs are supplied. Backward linkages from MNEs to local firms are 
important channels through which intangible and tangible assets can be passed on from 
the former to the latter. Javorcik (2004) argues that MNEs have no incentive to prevent 
technology diffusion to upstream sectors as they may benefit from improved performance 
of intermediate input suppliers. MNEs may directly transfer knowledge to their local 
suppliers, urge them to upgrade their production management and technology and allow 
them to reap economies of scale. Thus, positive productivity spillovers are expected from 
backward linkages. The econometric studies of Driffield et al. (2002), Javorcik (2004) 
and Blalock and Gertler (2007) all confirm the existence of positive backward linkages 
from FDI.  
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However, there are growing suspicions regarding the positive effects from backward 
linkages. In their theoretical model, Lin and Saggi (2005) argue that FDI can affect the 
degree of backward linkages in two conflicting ways. Firstly, it creates demand for 
intermediate products (demand effect). Secondly, local firms competing with foreign 
firms may be forced to reduce their output and hence their own demand for the 
intermediate products (competition effect). If the competition effect exceeds the demand 
effect, there will be net negative backward linkage effects. Dolan and Humphrey (2000), 
Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) and Dries and Swinnen (2004) provide some 
anecdotal evidence that there are negative spillovers from backward linkages in 
developing countries as local suppliers cannot comply with the higher standards and 
grading requirements for the supplied products.  
 
Forward linkages arise when foreign firms sell goods and services to local firms. This 
type of linkage may contribute to the development of local distribution and sales 
organizations (Reuber et al. 1973; Blomström and Kokko, 1998).  Forward linkages may 
also facilitate the adoption of new technologies and can solve contract enforcement 
problems (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Key and Runsten, 1999; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
There are few econometric studies on forward linkages, and there is much less evidence 
of forward than backward linkages. Nevertheless, Driffield et al. (2002) find some 
positive externalities in local firms who make purchases from the foreign sector in the 
UK.  
 
In conclusion, theoretically, productivity spillover effects of horizontal and vertical 
linkages can be positive, negative or insignificant. Existing empirical studies based on 
large firm-level panel data largely focus on horizontal linkages and there is no conclusive 
finding on the spillover effects from horizontal linkages in developing countries. Only a 
few studies look at horizontal and vertical linkages simultaneously and conclude that 
vertical linkages are more likely to generate positive spillovers than horizontal ones.  
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III. Data and Methodology 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on data compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of China. 
The primary data are taken from the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics, 
covering firms during the period of 1998-2001. Deflators employed are price indices for 
total manufacturing fixed assets and industrial output and are obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook 2002. To construct linkage variables, the 1997 Input-Output Table of 
China is used. A more detailed description of the data sources and variable definitions is 
provided in Appendix A.  
 
To estimate the impact of the linkage effects of foreign firms on local productivity, we 
adopt a two-step procedure similar to that employed by Javorcik (2004). First, we 
estimate firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). In the second step, the linkage effects of 
FDI on TFP are investigated.  
 
There are a number of alternative means of measuring TFP including index numbers, data 
envelopment analysis, stochastic frontier analysis, instrumental variables estimation 
techniques and semiparametric estimation techniques. Van Biesebroeck (2007) provides a 
detailed review and uses Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the sensitivity of estimators 
to various complications. The semiparametric method developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996) is shown to be remarkably robust to different forms of measurement and 
specification errors. Olley and Pakes (1996) proxy method is modified by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003). Both methods control for simultaneity bias and selection bias, but their 
main difference is the proxy used.  
 
There are reasons to believe that firms adjust their inputs according to their expectations 
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1995), so input levels are most likely correlated with 
idiosyncratic shocks in productivity captured in the error term. Using least squares cannot 
produce consistent estimates. The principle of the proxy methods is to use another 
decision by the firm to provide separate information on the unobserved productivity term. 
In Olley and Pakes (1996), investment is assumed to be a monotonic function of 
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productivity. But with this method, firms with zero investment are excluded from the 
sample. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose to use intermediate inputs as a proxy. They 
highlight three advantages of using intermediate inputs as compared with using 
investment. First, there is a stronger link between economic theory and estimation with 
intermediate inputs as a valid proxy. Second, intermediate inputs respond to the entire 
productivity term, whereas investments partially respond to the “news” in the unobserved 
term. Third, firms usually have positive intermediate inputs though often incur zero 
investment. A brief description of the Levinsohn-Petrin estimation procedure is provided 
in Appendix B. 
 
After deriving TFP estimates from heterogeneous, industry-specific production functions, 
we then relate TFP to FDI variables. In this step, FDI is expected to have linkage effects 
on firm productivity.  
 
ln(TFPijt) = 0 + 1HLFPjt + 2BLFPjt + 3FLFPjt + X + μijt  (1) 
 
where ln(TFPijt) is the logarithm of the TFP of firm i in sector j at time t. HLFP, BLFP 
and FLFP capture the horizontal, backward and forward linkages of foreign firms 
respectively. X is a vector of control variables.  
 
Given that our aim is to assess the extent of spillovers through horizontal and vertical 
linkages of foreign firms, we need some indices for foreign presence in these linkages. As 
indicated earlier, we propose that different measures may capture different aspects of 
productivity spillovers. If foreign equity capital is applied, then the positive spillover 
effects may indicate that the foreign presence produces positive capital spillover effects 
and vice versa. In this case, the externalities are closely related to the demonstration 
effect of the suitability of the project, or the superiority of machinery or equipment 
embodying updated technologies. Similarly, if employment in foreign firms is applied, 
then the spillover effects will be closely associated with employee turnover or contagion 
between employees in foreign and local firms. This can be referred to as employment 
spillovers. Following Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Javorcik (2004), we also use 
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weighted foreign equity capital as measures. Consequently, we have the following four 
measures for intra-industry FDI spillover effects (i.e. horizontal linkage effects):  
1. the share of foreign equity capital in the sector’s total equity capital (CA); 
2. the share of MNEs’ employment in the sector’s total employment (EM); 
3. the share of foreign equity participation weighted by sales (SAW); and  
4. the share of foreign equity participation weighted by employment (EMW). 
 
Similar to Driffield et al. (2002), Javorcik (2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2007), in this 
paper the linkage variables are approximated by using weights derived from the input-
output (I-O) table. The I-O table gives the share of goods in industry m used for the 
production of each unit of the goods in industry n. The underlying assumption is that the 
amount of knowledge gained from FDI in an industry m is proportional to industry m’s 
importance in industry n’s input or output structure and FDI share in industry n. 
 
Backward linkage effects measure the extent to which firms in upstream industry n 
purchase inputs from firms in downstream industries. In the present context, backward 
linkage effects result from MNEs using intermediate inputs (including goods and 
services) purchased locally. FDI backward linkages are proxied by nmn HLFP  m  n, 
where mn, obtained from the I-O table, is the proportion of industry m’s output supplied 
to industry n. HLFPn is the foreign presence in industry n which measures intra-industry 
or horizontal linkage effects of FDI. To illustrate the meaning of the variable, we here 
provide an example. Our data show that the electricity transmission, distribution & 
control equipment sector (I-O code 75 in Table A1) sold 0.03% of its output to the 
computer sector (I-O code 76 in Table A1), 0.3% to the household electronic appliances 
sector (I-O code 77 in Table A1), 1.57% to the electronic devices and components sector 
(I-O code 78 in Table A1), and 0.21% to the other electronic and telecommunication 
equipment sector (I-O code 79 in Table A1). The shares of foreign output in these sectors 
were 85.75%, 75.19%, 79.35% and 80.94%, respectively, in 2000. The backward linkage 
variable measured by industrial output for these sectors should then be 0.0167 
(=85.75%*0.03% + 75.19%*0.3% + 79.35%*1.57% + 80.94%*0.21%), implying that 
approximately 1.67% of output in the electricity transmission, distribution & control 
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equipment sector was sold to foreign firms in the electronic and telecommunication 
equipment sector.  
 
Analogously, forward linkage effects measure the extent to which firms from upstream 
industry m sell their outputs to firms in downstream industries. Forward linkage effects 
result from foreign firms supplying intermediate inputs to downstream industries. It is 
proxied by nmn HLFPD  m  n, where mn is the share of inputs purchased by industry 
m in total inputs provided by industry n. HLFPDn is the share of MNEs’ 
assets/employment/sales in industry n which are present locally. HLFPD equals HLFP for 
all other cases except for sales which should be sales minus exports (DSW). This is 
straightforward as only goods and services provided locally by foreign firms create any 
forward linkage. Exported goods and services by foreign firms are not expected to have 
the impact they might have on the domestic market.  
 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the share of foreign sector by individual manufacturing 
sectors. Shares of foreign firms in total number of firms in our panels range from 23% in 
beverage production to 79% in garment production. The table reveals that there is a 
greater concentration of foreign firms in labor intensive, low and medium-tech sectors
i
.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical results, we need to address a few econometric 
concerns. Firstly, the correlation between foreign presence and productivity enhancement 
in firms may be affected by other factors such as fixed firm-, time-, industry- and region-
specific factors such as high-quality management, infrastructure and technology 
opportunity. To control for these fixed effects, we include firm-, year-, industry- and 
region-dummies, wherever appropriate. An alternative method to the fixed effects model 
is differencing (Wooldridge, 2002). The choice between first differencing and fixed 
effects hinges on the assumption about the idiosyncratic errors. In particular, the fixed 
effects estimator is more efficient if the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated, 
while the first differencing estimator is more efficient when the idiosyncratic errors 
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follow a random walk (Wooldridge, 2002). However, partly because our panel data 
structure has a short time period (only four years), our discussion will be based mainly on 
the fixed effects models, but the results of first differencing models will also be briefly 
compared and discussed.  
 
Secondly, since our linkage measures vary across industries, any clustering in the 
residuals μijt in (1) may be exacerbated (Moulton, 1990). Hence equation (1) is estimated 
with correction for heteroskedasticity and for clustering at the industry-year level. In 
other words, in all estimations, we allow for clustering at the industry-year level to 
account for correlations between firm observations within the same industry-year. 
According to Wooldridge (2002, pp. 275-276), “the robust variance matrix estimator is 
valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity or serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
errors {uit: t = 1, …T}, provided that T is small relative to N”. Our dataset covers 4 years 
and around 30,000 firms, so serial correlation is more likely to be within the group. This 
clustering method using the robust variance matrix is a valid approach to addressing 
serial correlation. We have followed Wooldridge (2002) to scale the standard errors to 
take into account alternative forms of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, that is, to 
allow correlated errors within the cluster. 
 
The final econometric issue is selection bias which may occur due to firm entry and exit, 
but which may also simply reflect some firms choosing not to report. This problem can, 
to some extent, be controlled for by the use of unbalanced panels (Levinsohn and Petrin, 
2003). Alternatively, it can be dealt with using the Heckman (1979) technique. However, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (1999) demonstrate that controlling for selection bias has little 
effect on the final parameter estimates. Furthermore, as argued by Haskel et al. (2007), 
“research is ongoing as to the best estimator for addressing issues such as selection”. 
Following Haskel et al. (2007), we too decide not to implement a structural approach to 
address selection bias.  
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IV. Empirical Results 
 
The summary statistics of the variables including means and standard deviations are 
provided in Table 2. Standard deviations for between and within components suggest, for 
all variables under consideration, that variation across firms is greater than that within a 
firm over time
ii
. Different measures of horizontal, backward and forward linkages are 
highly, but not perfectly correlated, respectively
iii
. As a result, each of the four measures 
of the spillover variables enters equation (1) separately in order to avoid multicollinearity. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Different estimation methods produce different coefficients on labor and capital. The 
results for returns on capital and labor using ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effects 
(FE) and Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) estimation methods are given in Table 3
iv
. As OLS does 
not take into account the unobserved firm characteristics, such as management, 
infrastructure and the availability of finance that could affect firm’s productivity, we 
follow Haskel et al. (2007) and estimate production functions using a FE model 
incorporating a full set of firm, industry, year and regional fixed effects. However, there 
are still problems of a simultaneity bias and selection bias as discussed in the previous 
section. To address the problem, we employ the LP method. In addition, we also relax the 
assumption that the production function coefficients are the same for all industries by 
employing estimation techniques industry by industry. Table 3 reveals that, using all 
three methods, capital and labor elasticities are positive and statistically significant for all 
eight industries in the sample. However, because productivity shocks and input usage 
tend to be correlated, the OLS coefficients are likely to be biased, which is confirmed in 
Table 3.  
  
<Table 3 about here> 
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IV.1 Linkage Effects on All Firms 
 
We start with estimating equation (1) for all firms, whether they are foreign or local, in 
Chinese manufacturing. In Table 4, the results of linkage effects of FDI on firm 
productivity are presented. In these estimations, the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of TFP which is recovered from the LP method. The independent variables in which we 
are particularly interested are horizontal, backward and forward linkages from FDI. The 
equation also includes firm, industry, year and region dummies. The model goodness-of-
fit test statistics are all statistically significant. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, the coefficients on all four alternative measures of 
horizontal spillover variable are statistically insignificant. This seems to indicate that the 
productivity of firms is not significantly influenced by foreign firms in the same industry. 
The results on the vertical linkage variables are very encouraging. The coefficients on all 
the four different measures of backward linkages are consistently positive, and 
statistically significant. Very similar results can be identified for forward linkages. The 
effect of vertical linkage variables on productivity seems to suggest an economically 
meaningful relationship. For example, ceteris paribus, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the backward linkage variable measured by capital (14.5%), on average, results in a 
rise of 23% TFP growth and a one-standard-deviation increase in the forward linkage 
variable measured by capital (5.2%), on average leads to an 8.3% increase in TFP 
growth. Hence, our findings tend to suggest that FDI has generated positive productivity 
spillovers via vertical linkages, i.e. both backward and forward linkages. The vertical 
linkage effects may come from demonstration effects, labor contagion effects, or the 
combination of the two. 
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IV.2 Linkage Effects at the Regional Level 
 
Spillover effects could be received first by the neighboring firms. The benefits may then 
gradually spread to other, more distant firms. Are the spillover effects in China local or 
national in scale? Following Aitken and Harrison (1999), we include both regional and 
sectoral variables in the same regressions. All firms are grouped into 29 regions which 
are defined at the level of province, autonomous region and central municipality
v
. The 
results for the linkage effects at the regional level are reported in Table 5.  
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
It can be seen that, among the four within-the-region horizontal variables only equity 
capital weighted by employment is statistically significant. Furthermore, among the four 
within-the-region backward linkage variables, only equity capital and equity capital 
weighted by employment are statistically significant. On the other hand, three out of the 
four within-the-region forward linkage variables remain statistically significant. These 
results indicate that there is some (weak) evidence of both positive horizontal and 
positive vertical spillover effects from FDI within regions. In horizontal linkages, 
productivity spillovers tend to occur only when the demonstration and contagion effects 
work together. In vertical linkages, the demonstration and contagion effects work either 
independently or jointly. The regression results indicate that the examination of spillover 
effects is indeed sensitive to the way foreign presence is measured. If horizontal linkage 
was not measured by equity capital weighted by employment, any evidence of linkage 
effects would not be revealed. 
 
IV.3 Linkage Effects on Different Groups of Firms 
 
So far we have found evidence of productivity spillovers via vertical linkages at the 
national and regional level and some (weak) evidence of productivity spillovers from 
horizontal linkages at the regional level. However, which group of firms benefits most 
from the presence of FDI, foreign or indigenous Chinese firms
vi
? Studies such as Aitken 
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and Harrison (1999) find that horizontal spillovers from foreign firms mainly benefit 
other foreign firms, not domestically-owned firms in the same industry. To what extent is 
Venezuela’s experience resembled by China?  
 
In China, industry used to be dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but 
economic reform has resulted in a substantial change in ownership structure. According 
to the most recent China economic census (http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/index.htm), the 
share of SOEs in terms of the registered number of enterprises had declined by 48% to 
192,000 during the period of 2001 and 2004 and only accounts for 6% of the total 
3,250,000 enterprises. On the other hand, the non-state-owned Chinese firms have gained 
momentum, especially privately-owned firms. There were 2,096,000 non-state-owned 
Chinese firms, among which 1,982,000 were privately-owned. Foreign firms also see 
their importance increase. In China’s FDI statistics, there are two main types of foreign 
investors: overseas Chinese investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT), and 
other investors mainly from OECD countries. The number of HMT firms was 74,000, 
while that of OECD firms was 78,000, each accounting for over 2% of the total.  
 
It is recognized that HMT and OECD firms have heterogeneous properties, pertaining to, 
e.g. size, labor productivity, profitability and technological capability. OECD firms are 
superior to HMT firms in product innovation and technological development (Huang, 
2004; Wei and Liu, 2006). The productivity of a foreign firm is expected to be influenced 
by the presence of all other foreign firms in Chinese manufacturing. On the other hand, 
for domestic sectors, SOEs are still perceived as facing soft-budget constraints and 
privileged access to financial capital. Non-SOEs are much more market-oriented than 
SOEs. Indigenous Chinese firms of different ownership behave differently with respect to 
imitation, innovation and competition, and have different technological capabilities for 
knowledge absorption from the presence of foreign firms (Li et al. 2001). Huang (2004) 
notes that, in the scope of cooperative operations, HMT firms have a tendency to prefer to 
cooperate with non-SOEs, whereas OECD firms tend to prefer to cooperate with SOEs. 
This fact may also have significant implications for the spillover effects of FDI for 
different groups of firms.  
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This subsection compares the linkages effects of FDI on these four types of firms. The 
results are presented in Table 6. For HMT firms, there is no evidence of horizontal 
productivity spillovers from other foreign firms to HMT firms in Chinese manufacturing 
because not a single measure of horizontal linkages is statistically significant. There is no 
evidence of productivity spillovers from forward linkages either. However, the 
significantly positive coefficients on backward linkages measured by equity capital and 
equity capital weighted by sales offer some evidence of spillover effects on HMT firms 
due to their vertical linkages with all other foreign firms, whether they are HMT or 
OECD ones.  
 
As for the group of OECD firms, the coefficients on the horizontal linkage variables 
measured by equity capital and equity capital weighted by sales are positive and 
statistically significant. All the coefficients on vertical linkages are positive and 
statistically significant except on forward linkages measured by equity capital weighted 
by sales. So, it seems that there is some evidence of productivity spillovers from foreign 
presence to both HMT and OECD firms in Chinese manufacturing. There also seems to 
be more evidence of vertical spillovers than horizontal ones. Comparing the two groups 
of foreign firms, OECD firms tend to benefit more from foreign presence than HMT 
firms do, as the former enjoy positive productivity externalities not only from backward 
linkages (as HMT firms do), but also from forward and some horizontal linkages with all 
other foreign firms. This result may not be a surprise. Since the technological and hence 
the absorptive capabilities of OECD firms are generally higher than those of HMT firms 
(Buckley et al, 2002; Wei and Liu, 2006), the former are able to learn more than the latter 
in their transactional linkages. 
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
Turning to the domestic sector in which we are most interested, the level of productivity 
in SOEs is positively correlated with all different measures of backward and forward 
linkages. There is some evidence of negative productivity spillovers from FDI in the 
 18 
same industries, as the coefficients on horizontal linkages measured by employment and 
equity capital weighted by employment are negative and statistically significant. This 
suggests that the competition from foreign firms is so fierce that its negative impacts 
significantly outweigh foreign firms’ possibly positive demonstration and contagion 
effects on SOEs in the same industries. However, this does not prevent SOEs from 
benefiting from vertical linkages with foreign firms as the latter may be more willing to 
transfer knowledge to their local suppliers or offering assistance to their local customers.  
 
Finally, we examine the linkage effects on non-SOEs. Similar to the case of SOEs, there 
is evidence of negative horizontal spillovers as the coefficients on horizontal linkages 
measured by employment and equity capital weighted by employment are statistically 
significant. The insignificant coefficients on vertical linkage variables indicate that there 
is no significant relationship between the level of productivity in non-SOEs and foreign 
presence in different industries. Thus, non-SOEs do not perform as well as SOEs in terms 
of learning via vertical linkages with foreign firms. In horizontal linkages, like SOEs, 
non-SOEs are technologically disadvantaged compared with their foreign counterparts in 
Chinese manufacturing. The negative externalities non-SOEs suffer via competition from 
foreign firms may significantly exceed any possible positive gains arising from 
demonstration and contagion effects. In vertical linkages, probably because non-SOEs are 
relatively inexperienced and have smaller size and lower technological capabilities than 
SOEs, they are unable to benefit from their transactional linkages with MNEs in different 
industries.  However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution. As our sample does 
not include those small-sized enterprises, it is likely that the obtained results 
underestimate the possible linkage effects of FDI on non-SOEs. 
 
In summary, China’s experience seems to resemble that in other emerging economies. 
Similar to Venezuela (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999), horizontal spillovers of FDI have 
been confined to a certain group of foreign firms, while domestically-owned firms are 
actually hurt by competition from foreign firms. Compared with the experience of 
Lithuania (see Javorcik, 2004) and Indonesia (see Blalock and Gertler, 2007), Chinese 
SOEs, like Lithuanian and Indonesian firms benefit from backward linkage effects. 
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However, different from Lithuanian firms, they also enjoy forward linkage effects
vii
. On 
the other hand, unlike local Lithuanian and Indonesian firms, Chinese non-SOEs not only 
face tough competition from foreign firms in the same industries, but they do not appear 
to significantly gain from any vertical linkages at all.  
 
IV.4 Alternative Estimation Methods 
 
To double check our results, we follow Aitken and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004) and 
Haskel et al. (2007) and estimate the first-differencing model. As discussed in section III, 
It is an alternative method to the fixed effects model. The results of first-differencing 
model are presented in Table 7. While “the examination of longer differences gives 
relatively more weight to more persistent changes in the variables of interest and hence 
reduces the influences of noise” (Javorcik, 2004), the relatively short time period of our 
data set does not allow us to do so. In estimating the first differencing model, Javorcik 
(2004) and Haskel et al. (2007) keep the industry- and region-fixed effects. In our study, 
we estimated the first differencing model both with and without the industry- and region-
fixed effects for comparison.  
 
The results from the first differencing model without the industry- and region- fixed 
effects are presented in the upper panel of Table 7. It is clear that all horizontal linkage 
variables remain statistically insignificant after the differencing. All the positive vertical 
spillover effects remain statistically significant in all four different measures except in 
specification (3) where the forward linkage variable is marginal statistically insignificant. 
These results are quite consistent with those of the fixed effects model. This should not 
be a surprise. One main purpose of differencing is to remove fixed effects, hence one 
should expect the results to be similar to those of the fixed effects model.  
 
However, the results from the first differencing model with the industry- and region-fixed 
effects are substantially different: while all the horizontal linkage variables remain 
insignificant, some vertical linkage variables become insignificant and bear an 
unexpected negative sign
viii
. This inconsistency may be partially due to multicollinearity. 
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After first differencing, the explanatory variables are correlated with the industry 
dummies. As a result, given the data set, we feel that the results from the fixed effects 
model and the first differencing model without the industry- and region-fixed effects are 
more reliable than those from the first-differencing model with industry- and region-fixed 
effects.   
 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
Another alternative to model the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by robust 
standard errors, taking into account fixed effects, is to estimate the parameters of a 
population-averaged model. The results are presented in the lower panel of Table 7. 
Again the results are broadly in line with those of the fixed effects model and the first 
differencing model without the industry- and region-fixed effects.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Summary 
 
While important, the existing empirical results investigating productivity spillovers from 
FDI horizontal and vertical linkages simultaneously are not only relatively rare but also 
inconclusive. The current study follows a two-step procedure to investigate whether there 
are productivity spillovers from transactional linkages with MNEs in Chinese 
manufacturing. In the first step, TFP in firms is estimated using the Levinsohn-Petrin 
(2003) method. In the second step, the linkage effects of FDI on TFP are investigated. It 
is found that FDI generates positive vertical linkage effects in Chinese manufacturing at 
both the national and regional level, and limited positive horizontal spillovers at the 
regional level. The finding that horizontal spillovers are only local in scale is consistent 
with Wei and Liu (2006). When all existing firms in Chinese manufacturing are divided 
into four groups, OECD firms appear to gain from both vertical and probably horizontal 
linkages, and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwanese firms only benefit from backward 
linkage effects. In the domestic sector in which we are most interested, both SOEs and 
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non-SOEs are hurt by competition from foreign firms in the same industries. While SOEs 
gain from vertical linkages with foreign firms, non-SOEs fail to do so.  
 
The patterns of productivity spillovers from FDI in Chinese manufacturing seem to be 
determined by one key factor – technological capabilities of all firms involved, and this 
seems to be consistent with Cantwell (1989) who argues that the effectiveness of 
knowledge spillovers depends largely on the technical capabilities of the recipient firms. 
OECD firms gain from transactional linkages as they have the high technological 
capabilities. HMT firms are not hurt in competition in the same industries and benefit 
from vertical linage effects. The reason why SOEs perform better than non-SOEs may be 
that the former have higher capabilities due to their larger size (more resources) and long-
term support by the Chinese government. Our findings also confirm that the linkage 
effects are to some extent sensitive to the measurement of foreign presence. In addition, 
the Chinese experience seems to resemble to some extent that in other emerging 
economies. 
 
Data Limitations 
 
The results from this study need to be interpreted with caution as there are several 
limitations. The most important issue is with the data set used. Although there are on 
average more than 20,000 observations each year in our sample, they come from 8 two-
digit sectors and for a period of four years only. In addition, as the explanatory variables 
after first differencing are correlated with the industry dummies, our results from the 
fixed effects model are only qualitatively comparable with the first differencing model 
without the industry- and region-fixed effects and the population-average model, but not 
the first differencing model with industry- and region-fixed effects. A more 
comprehensive data set with a wider coverage of sectors and a longer time period may 
allow a researcher to capture the long term effects of FDI and obtain more robust results. 
Related to the first problem, the second caveat is that the relations among FDI, 
technological spillovers, and intra- and inter-industry linkages may be dynamic in nature 
and the effects are materialized with considerable time lags, but data limitations have 
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forced us to analyze the question contemporaneously. Third, the input-output table 
produced in China is not sufficiently disaggregated. Thus, some horizontal linkages 
defined by this study could be vertical if a more disaggregated industrial classification is 
applied
ix
. Our fourth concern is related to the use of an input-output table as the proxy for 
FDI linkage effects in general. As the linkage behavior of multinational enterprises may 
well be different from that of local firms, the use of average industrial transaction 
coefficients for foreign firms may be problematic. Fifth, China had practiced local 
content requirement, tax holiday and duty rebate policies for MNEs. These policies may 
have affected the production and transaction behaviors of both MNEs and local Chinese 
firms, and hence our findings. However, we find it impossible to quantify the impact of 
these policies. Finally, in its early stage of opening to the outside world, China granted 
various fiscal and financial concessions or incentives in order to attract FDI. This led to 
round-tripping FDI, i.e. investment by Chinese residents made through intermediates in 
other countries that allow these investors to get any favorable treatment extended to 
foreign investors. The World Bank (2002) estimated that 20-30% of total FDI into China 
was the result of such ‘round-tripping’ from Hong Kong, Macao or Virgin Islands. One 
could argue that this kind of investment would be unlikely to generate any spillover 
benefits
x
.  The extent of these policy measures was reduced after 1995 when China 
committed to national treatment of foreign firms (Wei, 2004) which implies that local 
Chinese firms hence have had less incentive to conduct this type of investment. Although 
our data period started from as late as 1998, it is still likely that some so-called Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwanese firms included in the sample are actually round-tripped 
local Chinese firms. If these firms could be identified and excluded, the productivity 
spillover performance of HMT firms would probably be better. 
 
Following Javorcik (2004), we call for further research using data that allow for 
identification of individual firms as actual transactional partners with MNEs rather than 
relying on input-output matrices to measure interactions between sectors. Furthermore, 
we suggest that econometric studies are complemented by case studies. Actually, Wei et 
al. (2008) find that almost all eight companies interviewed agree that local Chinese firms 
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benefit from their horizontal and vertical linkages with foreign firms. Case studies can 
provide more insights on this topic. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
Given the tentative nature of the results obtained and the data limitations described 
above, we should exercise caution in drawing policy implications. Nevertheless, the 
scarcity of existing research on simultaneously investigating FDI horizontal and vertical 
linkage effects warrants some discussion of potential policy implications that could be 
derived from the above empirical findings. Recognizing the potential spillover effects of 
FDI linkages with the local economy, the Chinese governments, at the national and 
regional level, have devoted resources and launched policy initiatives to attract FDI and 
stimulate linkages between foreign and local firms. Our empirical results demonstrate the 
substantial impact that foreign firms have on a host country is through vertical linkages, 
hence providing some justification for some of those actions and policies. However, to 
benefit more from transactional linkages, firms themselves need to enhance their ability 
to learn. This is especially important for local firms in a developing country like China, as 
their technological capabilities are relatively low. High technological capabilities make it 
easier for local firms to forge vertical linkages with and learn from foreign firms in the 
related industries. High technological capabilities also enable local firms to be in a better 
position to compete and collaborate with foreign firms in the same industries, and could 
possibly turn the negative horizontal linkage effects around to be positive. The Chinese 
government needs to make every effort to provide a more favorable business environment 
to encourage local firms to conduct more R&D and improve their technological 
capabilities.  
 
Secondly, as an important channel of spillovers is through labor mobility, establishing an 
efficient labor market is important for a local economy to benefit from the spillover 
effects of FDI. In China, despite the fact that labor migration (intra- and inter-region) has 
been a profound phenomenon, the hukou (household registration) system and regional 
disparity in the development of the labor market
xi
 create a hindrance for local firms to 
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benefit from the presence of MNEs. The government should adopt more proactive 
policies to deal with labor market inefficiencies.  
 
Thirdly, the fact that horizontal productivity spillovers may be only local in scale is 
partially due to local protectionism (Batisse and Poncet, 2004) or regional disparity in 
China, or both. The barriers to flow of goods and services, to some extent, reduce 
horizontal linkages between regions (Wei and Liu, 2006). On the other hand, different 
development levels between coastal, inland and western areas may also hamper 
horizontal knowledge spillovers across regions. Thus, the Chinese government should 
remove these barriers and try to promote regional integration. Recent attempts at regional 
policies such as the Develop the West policy and the Revitalize the North East policy are 
moves in the right direction.    
 
Fourthly, an important lesson that can be drawn relates to our finding that SOEs’ 
performance is improved by the presence of foreign firms in related and supporting 
industries. To improve SOEs’ efficiency, recently there have been many policy initiatives 
including addressing issues relating to technical change, subsiding innovations and 
technical change, reducing the gearing ratios by transforming debt into stocks, and 
promoting exports. The government has also tried to restructure industry via mergers, 
closures and bureaucratic restructuring. Some of the unprofitable SOEs have been 
merged with successful ones. Our finding suggests that policy analysis could also focus 
upon the economic significance of linkage effects from FDI.  
 
Fifthly, China’s economic reform has resulted in a substantial change in ownership 
structure. Industry is no longer dominated by SOEs. On the contrary, it is now dominated 
by non-state-owned Chinese enterprises and they have been the major source for 
employment creation and local economic development in addition to production. It is 
unlikely that this trend will be reversed. Hence, this imposes a requirement on 
government to help non-state-owned Chinese enterprises to benefit from FDI linkage 
effects. Policies in China by and large are still biased towards SOEs. However, we 
propose that these policies should be equally extended to non-SOEs.  
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Finally, home governments and managers of MNEs need to realize that MNEs can 
benefit from the presence of other firms in a host country. Thus, outward FDI can be 
encouraged.  
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Appendix A. Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
 
The firm level data set used in this study is from the Annual Report of Industrial 
Enterprise Statistics compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of China, covering firms 
during the period 1998-2001 in the following industries: Food processing, Food 
manufacturing, Beverage production, Garments and other fiber products, Medical and 
pharmaceutical products, Ordinary machinery manufacturing, Transport equipment 
manufacturing, Electrical machines and apparatuses, and Electronic and 
telecommunications equipment. For each industry, the Bureau collects detailed data on 
each industrial firm in operation. The data include information on ownership 
classification, value added
xii
, output, capital stock, number of employees, sales, intangible 
assets, new product sales and exports. To remove the influence of inflation, variables 
have been adjusted by relevant deflators. Price indices for total manufacturing fixed 
assets and industrial output are used, which are obtained from the China Statistical 
Yearbook 2002.  
 
year 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total 23,355 26,540 24,695 19,597 
No. of Domestically-owned Firms 14,966 16,568 14,180 10,377 
No. of Foreign Firms 8,389 9,972 10,515 9,220 
Of which     
No. of Firms with FDI by  HMT only 4,448 5,341 5,540 4,739 
No. of Firms with FDI by OECD only 3,786 4,469 4,793 4,304 
No. of Firms with FDI by HMT and OECD 155 162 182 177 
 
Due to entry and exit and ownership restructuring, the number of firms in operation is 
changing over time. In this study, the same firms can be identified based on their 
identifiers. The data are cleaned via extensive checks for nonsense observations, outliers, 
coding mistakes, and the like. This finally produces an unbalanced set of 32,008 firms. 
The detailed distribution by year and by ownership is provided in the table above. A firm 
is defined to be domestically-owned, if its foreign equity participation, if any, is below 
25%. In this data set, there are two types of foreign presence: overseas Chinese from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT), and other foreign investors mainly from OECD 
countries (OECD).  
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In the paper, region is defined at the level of province, autonomous region and central 
municipality. Mainland China can be broadly divided into three macro areas and 31 
provinces, autonomous regions and central municipalities. The coastal area includes 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The central area includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. And the western area 
includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang and 
Tibet. There are no data available for Tibet. Chongqing was not separated from Sichuan 
until 1996 and thus been treated as one combined province. Hence in total, there are 29 
regions included in our sample. 
 
The I-O table uses an industry classification different from the SIC classification of the 
database of Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics. Nonetheless the I-O table 
provides the correspondence with the SIC classification at a 3-digit level. We aggregate 
the 59 3-digit industries to 25 sectors in the I-O tables (see Table A1). 
 
Table A1. Classification Scheme  
 
Industry SIC Code  
(China) 
I-O 
Sector 
Food processing; Food manufacturing 13; 14  
Food and feed; Vegetable oil 131; 132 14 
Sugar  133 15 
Slaughtering, meat products and egg products 134 16 
Aquatic products 135 17 
Salt; Other food processing; Pastry and confectionery 
manufacturing; Dairy products; Canned food; Fermented 
products; Spices; Other food manufacturing 
136; 139; 141; 
142; 143; 144; 
145; 149 
18 
Beverage production 15  
Alcohol and wine 151 19 
Soft drinks; Tea; Other beverages 152; 155; 159 20 
Garments and other fiber products 18  
Apparel; Hats; Shoes; Other apparel 181; 182; 183; 
189 
28 
 31 
Table A1 continued 
Industry SIC Code  
(China) 
I-O 
Sector 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 27  
Medicines and chemical reagents; Pharmaceutical 
preparations; Chinese medicines; Veterinary medicines; 
Biological products 
271; 272; 273; 
274; 275  
44 
Ordinary machinery manufacturing 35  
Boiler And Power Generation equipment 351 62 
Metal Processing machinery 352 63 
General equipment; Bearings and Valves; General parts; 
Castings and Forgings; General machinery repair; Other 
general machinery 
353; 354; 356; 
357; 358; 359 
64 
Transport equipment manufacturing 37  
Railway transport equipment 371 67 
Vehicles 372 68 
Motorcycles; Tram; Transport equipment repair; Other 
transport equipment; 
373; 375; 378; 
379 
72 
Bicycles 374 71 
Shipping  376 69 
Aircraft and spacecraft  377  70 
Electrical machines and apparatuses 40  
Motors 401 73 
Electricity transmission, distribution & control equipment; 
Electrical engineering equipment; Lighting equipment; 
Electrical equipment repair; Other electrical machinery 
402; 404; 407; 
408; 409 
75 
Household electrical appliances 406 74 
Electronic and telecommunications equipment 41  
Communication equipment; Radar; Broadcast and television 
equipment; Electronic and telecommunications equipment 
repair; Electronic equipment 
411; 412; 413; 
418; 419 
79 
Computers 414 76 
Electronic devices; Electronic components 415; 416 78 
Household electronic appliances 417 77 
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Appendix B. Levinsohn-Petrin Estimation Procedure 
 
Although a full description of Levinsohn-Petrin estimation is beyond the scope of this 
paper (interested readers are referred to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)), a brief sketch of 
the procedure is provided below. 
 
The estimation method starts with the following production function
xiii
: 
yt = c0 + c1kt + c2lt   (1) 
where yt is the logarithm of the value added, kt and lt are the logarithms of capital and 
labor respectively. Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) one can re-write (1) in the 
following way 
yt = c0 + c1lt + c2kt + c3mt + t + t (2) 
where t is the i.i.d. component of the disturbance term, and t is the state dependent 
unobserved productivity. Labor is assumed to be a variable input, while capital is a state 
variable. Demand for the intermediate inputs is assumed to be a function of capital and 
the state dependent productivity term: mt = mt(kt; t). When this demand function is 
monotonically increasing in t, one can express t by inverting the intermediate inputs 
demand function. In this case, the unobservable productivity is expressed in terms of 
observable variables. A final assumption required for the identification of the parameters 
of the production function is that t follows a first order Markov process:    t = E( t| t-
1) + t, where t is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt (Levinsohn 
and Petrin, 2003). With this model in hand, one can consistently estimate the parameters 
of the production function. 
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Table 1. The Share of Foreign Firms in Chinese Manufacturing, 2001 
% 
Industry Fixed 
Assets 
Employment Industrial 
Output 
Food processing 23 18 24 
Food manufacturing 42 25 40 
Beverage production 35 17 30 
Garments and other fiber products 45 47 46 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 21 12 22 
Ordinary machinery manufacturing 23 10 22 
Transport equipment manufacturing 30 11 31 
Electrical machines and apparatuses 38 28 33 
Electronic and telecommunications 
equipment 
66 55 74 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
  Variable Mean s.d. min max Number of  
Observations 
  log(value added) 8.140 1.964 0.000 16.398 96,255 
  log(capital) 8.687 1.891 -0.004 16.155 100,595 
  log(labor) 5.092 1.332 0.000 11.579 102,157 
  log(material) 9.170 1.978 0.000 17.192 101,425 
  log(TFP) 4.582 1.908 -5.481 12.274 94,730 
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Capital 0.427 0.160 0.005 0.761 102,236 
Employment  0.348 0.246 0.001 0.869 102,236 
Capital weighted  
by sales  
0.402 0.176 0.009 0.835 102,236 
Capital weighted  
by employment  
0.260 0.194 0.003 0.755 102,236 
B
ac
k
w
ar
d
  
v
ar
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Capital  0.094 0.145 0.000 0.645 102,236 
Employment  0.083 0.150 0.000 0.748 102,236 
Capital weighted  
by sales  
0.092 0.153 0.000 0.730 102,236 
Capital weighted  
by employment  
0.067 0.130 0.000 0.662 102,236 
F
o
rw
ar
d
  
v
ar
ia
b
le
 
Capital 0.040 0.052 0.001 0.310 102,236 
Employment  0.031 0.050 0.001 0.345 102,236 
Capital weighted  
by sales  
0.039 0.054 0.001 0.340 102,236 
Capital weighted  
by employment  
0.024 0.042 0.001 0.289 102,236 
Notes: s.d. = standard deviation; min = minimum; max = maximum  
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Table 3. OLS, Fixed Effects and Levinsohn-Petrin Estimation for Chinese Industry 
 OLS Fixed Effects Levinsohn-
Petrin 
Food processing; Food manufacturing    
log(capital) 0.260** 
(0.008) 
0.029** 
(0.010) 
0.137** 
(0.013) 
log(labor) 0.797** 
(0.011) 
0.425** 
(0.022) 
0.445** 
(0.013) 
Number of Observations 27,393 27,393 27,200 
Beverage production     
log(capital) 0.292** 
(0.014) 
0.057** 
(0.016) 
0.137** 
(0.020) 
log(labor) 0.970** 
(0.020) 
0.426** 
(0.048) 
0.572** 
(0.034) 
Number of Observations 6,484 6,484 6,434 
Garments and other fibre products     
log(capital) 0.195** 
(0.009) 
0.100** 
(0.016) 
0.148** 
(0.024) 
log(labor) 0.657** 
(0.015) 
0.429** 
(0.028) 
0.347** 
(0.019) 
Number of Observations 11,523 11,523 11,502 
Medical and pharmaceutical products     
log(capital) 0.301** 
(0.014) 
0.059** 
(0.018) 
0.194** 
(0.022) 
log(labor) 0.764** 
(0.021) 
0.327** 
(0.054) 
0.461** 
(0.036) 
Number of Observations 6,399 6,399 6,373 
Ordinary machinery manufacturing     
log(capital) 0.255** 
(0.010) 
0.036** 
(0.012) 
0.183** 
(0.019) 
log(labor) 0.617** 
(0.014) 
0.289** 
(0.033) 
0.474** 
(0.022) 
Number of Observations 11,970 11,970 11,883 
Transport equipment manufacturing     
log(capital) 0.342** 
(0.011) 
0.066** 
(0.015) 
0.157** 
(0.025) 
log(labor) 0.669** 
(0.015) 
0.402** 
(0.036) 
0.428** 
(0.029) 
Number of Observations 10,853 10,853 10,775 
Electrical machines and apparatuses     
log(capital) 0.295** 
(0.010) 
0.080** 
(0.015) 
0.183** 
(0.030) 
log(labor) 0.626** 
(0.015) 
0.544** 
(0.032) 
0.369** 
(0.022) 
Number of Observations 10,277 10,277 10,238 
Electronic and telecommunications 
equipment 
   
log(capital) 0.300** 
(0.011) 
0.066** 
(0.019) 
0.195** 
(0.029) 
log(labor) 0.631** 
(0.016) 
0.543** 
(0.033) 
0.331** 
(0.020) 
Number of Observations 9,831 9,831 9,782 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Table 4: Linkage Effects of FDI on Productivity at the National Level 
Measure of FDI spillover effects Capital  Employment  Capital weighted  
by sales 
capital weighted  
by employment 
Horizontal  0.083 
(0.400) 
-0.298 
(0.398) 
-0.145 
(0.544) 
-0.107 
(0.351) 
Backward  1.587** 
(0.514) 
1.099** 
(0.341) 
1.169** 
(0.388) 
1.093** 
(0.334) 
Forward  1.592* 
(0.628) 
1.773** 
(0.562) 
1.190** 
(0.434) 
2.109* 
(0.833) 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Goodness-of-fit Test 5.73x10
9
** 1.98x10
9
** 5.91** 5.62** 
Number of observations 94,730 94,730 94,730 94,730 
Notes:  
1. The error terms are corrected for clustering at industry-year level.  
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5 Linkage Effects of FDI on Productivity at the Regional Level 
Measure of FDI spillover effects Capital  Employment  Capital weighted  
by sales 
capital weighted  
by employment 
Horizontal_within_region  0.065 
(0.050) 
0.115 
(0.072) 
0.106 
(0.069) 
0.212* 
(0.090) 
Backward_within_region  0.366† 
(0.187) 
0.140 
(0.285) 
0.488 
(0.306) 
0.846† 
(0.471) 
Forward_within_region  2.022** 
(0.732) 
1.631† 
(0.909) 
1.134 
(0.771) 
2.067* 
(0.963) 
Horizontal  0.054 
(0.333) 
-0.434 
(0.345) 
-0.264 
(0.450) 
-0.335 
(0.309) 
Backward  1.583** 
(0.459) 
1.204** 
(0.362) 
0.960* 
(0.386) 
0.709† 
(0.424) 
Forward  1.250** 
(0.438) 
1.292** 
(0.371) 
1.146** 
(0.285) 
1.371* 
(0.664) 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model Goodness-of-fit Test 1.03x10
9
** 79.98** 93.94** 7.67** 
Number of observations 94,730 94,730 94,730 94,730 
Notes:  
1. The error terms are corrected for clustering at industry-year level.  
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
3. † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 Linkage Effects on Firms of Different Ownership Groups  
 Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Firms OECD Firms 
Measure of FDI spillover 
effects 
Capital  Employment  Capital weighted 
by sales 
Capital weighted 
by employment 
Capital  Employment  Capital weighted 
by sales 
Capital weighted 
by employment 
Horizontal  -0.310 
(0.320) 
-0.167 
(0.347) 
0.217 
(0.317) 
0.178 
(0.333) 
0.493† 
(0.255) 
0.224 
(0.281) 
0.989* 
(0.391) 
0.198 
(0.284) 
Backward  0.724* 
(0.317) 
0.425 
(0.281) 
0.441† 
(0.224) 
0.244 
(0.253) 
2.343** 
(0.438) 
1.438** 
(0.381) 
1.453** 
(0.378) 
1.447** 
(0.406) 
Forward  0.843 
(0.582) 
-0.502 
(0.681) 
0.302 
(0.738) 
-0.945 
(0.786) 
1.318* 
(0.617) 
1.345* 
(0.593) 
0.715 
(0.442) 
1.559* 
(0.772) 
Firm dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Model Goodness-of-fit 
Test 
7.73** 6.89** 5.66** 6.19** 24.55** 28.32** 28.39** 83.36** 
Number of observations 20,083 20,083 20,083 20,083 17,379 17,379 17,379 17,379 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
Measure of FDI spillover 
effects 
Capital  Employment  Capital weighted 
by sales 
Capital weighted 
by employment 
Capital  Employment  Capital weighted 
by sales 
Capital weighted 
by employment 
Horizontal  0.079 
(0.357) 
-0.733† 
(0.398) 
-0.586 
(0.483) 
-0.690† 
(0.347) 
0.107 
(0.220) 
-1.001* 
(0.467) 
-0.484 
(0.567) 
-0.992* 
(0.452) 
Backward  1.369* 
(0.668) 
0.956† 
(0.515) 
1.086* 
(0.492) 
1.199* 
(0.478) 
0.021 
(0.541) 
0.526 
(0.457) 
0.171 
(0.439) 
0.604 
(0.498) 
Forward  2.467* 
1.025) 
4.007** 
(0.892) 
1.943* 
(0.843) 
5.416** 
(0.938) 
0.566 
(1.169) 
-0.090 
(1.065) 
0.024 
(1.091) 
0.394 
(1.197) 
Firm dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Model Goodness-of-fit test 8.44** 2543.35** 1.90x10
11
** 9.17 ** 23.45** 31.77** 31.78 ** 33.30** 
Number of observations 49,808 49,808 49,808 49,808 6,784 6,784 6,784 6,784 
Notes: 1. The error terms are corrected for clustering at industry-year level. 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 3. † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Linkage Effects of FDI on Productivity, Alternative Estimations  
First Differencing Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of FDI spillover effects Capital  Employment  Capital weighted  
by sales 
capital weighted  
by employment 
Horizontal  -0.016 
(0.351) 
-0.312 
(0.328) 
-0.208 
(0.461) 
-0.141 
(0.321) 
Backward  0.886* 
(0.347) 
0.759** 
(0.226)  
0.768* 
(0.334)  
0.784** 
(0.262)  
Forward  0.878† 
(0.473)  
1.347† 
(0.783)  
0.591 
(0.383) 
1.681† 
(0.988) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No No 
Region dummies No No No No 
Model Goodness-of-fit test 9.01** 3.35** 7.30** 2.62** 
Number of observations 61099 61099 61099 61099 
Population-Averaged Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of FDI spillover effects Capital  Employment  Capital weighted  
by sales 
capital weighted  
by employment 
Horizontal  0.030 
(0.097) 
-0.287† 
(0.151) 
-0.159 
(0.155) 
-0.129 
(0.156) 
Backward  1.148** 
(0.334) 
0.897** 
(0.205) 
0.940** 
(0.237) 
0.918** 
(0.211) 
Forward  1.168** 
(0.398) 
1.526** 
(0.454) 
0.862** 
(0.338) 
1.869** 
(0.542) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No No 
Region dummies No No No No 
Model Goodness-of-fit Test 69.18**  75.65**  70.40**  75.55** 
Number of observations 61,099 61,099 61,099 61,099 
Notes: 1. The error terms in first-differencing model are corrected for clustering at industry-year level. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 3. † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 According to the OECD (1996), food, drink, and garments belong to low-tech industries, and 
electrical machines and apparatuses and electronic and telecommunications equipment are medium-
tech industries, while high-tech industries include medical and pharmaceutical products, ordinary 
machinery manufacturing, and transport equipment manufacturing. 
ii
 Due to space constraints, standard deviations for between and within components are not reported, but 
are available upon request. 
iii
 Due to space constraints, the correlation coefficient matrix for spillovers variables is not presented 
but is available upon request.   
iv
 Translog production functions were also estimated industry by industry, but the results are 
unsatisfactory. This is largely because of the multicollinearity problem. The high correlations between 
the linear and the quadratic and cross terms in the translog specification may render inefficient 
estimations. 
v
 Please see Appendix A for the definitions of regions.  
vi
 We should note here that productivity of foreign firms may also be influenced by factors outside 
China. We thank an anonymous referee for this point.  
vii
 Blalock and Gertler (2007) only focus on horizontal and backward linkages, not forward linkages.  
viii
 The detailed results from the first differencing model with the industry- and region-fixed effects are 
not presented because of space limitations, but available upon request.  
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ix
 This may partially explain why our findings on horizontal spillovers are different from Wei and Liu 
(2006). Because we have to follow the definition of the industries used by the I-O table, our industries 
are more broadly defined than those in Wei and Liu (2006). Hence our results are not comparable.   
x
 We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.  
xi
 The coastal area has a better developed labor market than the inland. 
xii
 Value added here is defined as “the difference between the selling price of a product and the cost of 
externally purchased materials and services”. 
xiii
 It should be acknowledged that a production function like this is parsimonious, imposing a strong 
assumption of linear additivity of materials (raw materials and energy). Unfortunately, data on 
materials are not available, therefore, the obtained empirical results should be interpreted with caution.  
